1. For an examination of the sources of inadvertent war, see Alexander L. George (ed.), Preventing War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1991).
2. See Jack L. Snyder, ‘Perceptions of the Security Dilemma in 1914’, in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) pp. 153–79.
3. Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics, 30, 2 (January 1978) pp. 167–214.
4. Iraq’s armed forces numbered 188 000 in 1977, and 1 000 000 in 1987; Iran’s forces numbered 342 000 in 1977 and 645 500 in 1987, excluding 350 000 listed as reserves; Syria’s forces numbered 227 500 in 1977 and 407 500 in 1987; and Saudi Arabia’s forces numbered 61 500 in 1977 and 73 500 in 1987. Israel’s reserve system makes troop strength comparisons difficult, but in the same period its armoured capability grew by 25 per cent. See International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), The Military Balance, 1977/78 and 1987/88.
5. The plan is described in detail by Trevor Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars 1947–74 (London: MacDonald and Jane’s, 1978) pp. 240–1.