An Analysis of EU Voting Procedures in the Enlargement Context-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

An Analysis of EU Voting Procedures in the Enlargement Context

Published:2009-07-21 Issue:4 Volume:15 Page:393-408
ISSN:1083-0898
Container-title:International Advances in Economic Research
language:en
Short-container-title:Int Adv Econ Res

Author:

Bârsan-Pipu Nicolae,Tache Ileana

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance,Economics and Econometrics

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11294-009-9230-y.pdf

Reference19 articles.

1. Algaba, E., Bilbao, J. M., Fernandez Garcia, J. R., & Lopez, J. J. (2003). Computing power indices on multiple, majority games. Mathematical Social Sciences, 46, 63–80.

2. Baldwin, R., & Widgren, M. (2004). Winners and losers under various dual-majority voting rules for EU’s Council of Ministers. Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Policy Brief No. 50, April, http://www.shop.ceps.be .

3. Baldwin, R., & Widgren, M. (2007). Does the EU need a new Treaty? Centre for economic policy research (CEPR), Policy Insight No. 3, http://www.cepr.org .

4. Baldwin, R., Berglof, E., Giavazzi, F., & Widgren, M. (2000). EU reforms for tomorrow’s Europe. CEPR Discussion Paper 2623, http://www.cepr.org .

5. Banzhaf, J. F. (1965). Weighted voting doesn’t work: a mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Review, 19(2), 317–343.

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