Abstract
AbstractThe notion of intelligence is relevant to several fields of research, including cognitive and comparative psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and philosophy, among others. However, there is little agreement within and across these fields on how to characterise and explain intelligence. I put forward a behavioural, operational characterisation of intelligence that can play an integrative role in the sciences of intelligence, as well as preserve the distinctive explanatory value of the notion, setting it apart from the related concepts of cognition and rationality. Finally, I examine a popular hypothesis about the underpinnings of intelligence: the capacity to manipulate internal representations of the environment. I argue that the hypothesis needs refinement, and that so refined, it applies only to some forms of intelligence.
Funder
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference53 articles.
1. Adams, F. (2010). Why we still need a mark of the cognitive. Cognitive Systems Research, 11(4), 324–331.
2. Adams, F., & Aizawa, K. (2008). The bounds of cognition. Malden, MA: Wiley.
3. Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 617–45.
4. Block, N. (1981). Psychologism and behaviorism. The Philosophical Review, 90(1), 5.
5. Boyle, A. (2019). Mapping the minds of others. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 10(4), 747–767.
Cited by
5 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Intelligence and Consciousness;World Futures;2024-02-17
2. Understanding Artificial Agency;The Philosophical Quarterly;2024-02-07
3. How to deal with risks of AI suffering;Inquiry;2023-07-22
4. Identity of AI;Discover Artificial Intelligence;2022-11-14
5. Correction to: Intelligent Behaviour;Erkenntnis;2022-06-15