Abstract
AbstractThis paper is concerned with the content of the causal proportionality constraint. It investigates two general versions of the constraint, namely “horizontal” and “vertical” proportionality. Moreover, it discusses whether proportionality is considered an ontic or an epistemic, i.e. explanatory, constraint on causation in the context of some of the most prominent theories of causation. The following main claims are defended: (1) The horizontal (HP) and the vertical version (VP) of the proportionality constraint are logically independent. (2) HP is implied by some prominent theories of causation, not by others. (3) None of the discussed popular theories of causation contradicts either HP or VP. (4) HP and VP are not ontic or epistemic principles as such; rather, whether they are ontic or epistemic depends on the theories chosen plus background assumptions about the existence of higher-level causes and their non-identity to lower-level ones.
Funder
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Private Universität Witten/Herdecke gGmbH
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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