Abstract
AbstractThe paper presents different arguments against the necessity of mereological universalism. First, it argues that they are examples of a much more general argumentative structure. It then contends that some of these arguments cannot be resisted by distinguishing different variants of universalism that have been recently proposed in the literature—in contrast with recent suggestions to the contrary. Finally, it provides different ways to resist such contingentist arguments on behalf of universalists.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference41 articles.
1. Balashov, J. (2010). Persistence and spacetime. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2. Baxter, D., & Cotnoir, A. (Eds.). (2014). Composition is identity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Berto, F., & Carrara, M. (2009). To exist and to count. A note on the Minimalist View. dialectica, 63(3), 343–356.
4. Berto, F., & Shoonen, T. (2018). Conceivability and possibility: Some dilemmas for humeans. Synthese, 195, 2697–2715.
5. Black, M. (1952). The identity of indiscernibles. Mind, 61, 153–164.