Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, I investigate whether the intuitions that make connexive logics seem plausible might lie in pragmatic phenomena, rather than the semantics of conditional statements. I conclude that pragmatics indeed underwrites these intuitions, at least for indicative statements. Whether this has any effect on logic choice (and what that effect might be), however, heavily depends on one’s semantic theory of conditionals and on how one chooses to logically treat pragmatic failures.
Funder
Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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