On Logical and Scientific Strength-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On Logical and Scientific Strength

Published:2024-08-13 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:0165-0106
Container-title:Erkenntnis
language:en
Short-container-title:Erkenn

Author:

Incurvati Luca^ORCID,Nicolai Carlo^ORCID

Abstract

AbstractThe notion of strength has featured prominently in recent debates about abductivism in the epistemology of logic. Following Timothy Williamson and Gillian Russell, we distinguish between logical and scientific strength and discuss the limits of the characterizations they employ. We then suggest understanding logical strength in terms of interpretability strength and scientific strength as a special case of logical strength. We present applications of the resulting notions to comparisons between logics in the traditional sense and mathematical theories.

Funder

H2020 European Research Council

Arts and Humanities Research Council

HORIZON EUROPE Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10670-024-00835-2.pdf

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