Abstract
AbstractIt is widely held that whether a person is morally responsible for an outcome partly depends on whether certain causal relations obtain between that person and the outcome. This paper argues that, regardless of whether the preceding claim about moral responsibility is true, moral blameworthiness is independent of such causal considerations. This conclusion is motivated by considering cases from Carolina Sartorio and Sara Bernstein. The causal structures of these cases are complex. Sartorio and Bernstein believe that reaching conclusions about moral responsibility and blameworthiness requires wading through this complexity. But it is argued here that getting clear on these causal structures does not help us assess blameworthiness (regardless of the relevance of such considerations for drawing conclusions about moral responsibility). Moral blameworthiness simply does not turn on the considerations relevant to figuring out whether an agent causally contributed to an outcome.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference49 articles.
1. Ayars, A. (2021). Blaming for unreasonableness: Accountability without Ill will. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 19, 56–79.
2. Bernstein, S. (2016). Causal and moral indeterminacy. Ratio, 29, 434–447.
3. Bernstein, S. (2017). Causal proportions and moral responsibility. In D. Shoemaker (Ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility (Vol. 4, pp. 164–182). Oxford University Press.
4. Bernstein, S. (2019). Moral luck and deviant causation. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 43, 151–161.
5. Björnsson, G. (2017). Explaining (Away) the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. In P. Robichaud & J. W. Wieland (Eds.), Responsibility: The epistemic dimension (pp. 146–162). Oxford University Press.