Abstract
AbstractThe standard view of ignorance is that it consists in the mere lack of knowledge or true belief. Duncan Pritchard has recently argued, against the standard view, that ignorance is the lack of knowledge/true belief that is due to an improper inquiry. I shall call, Pritchard’s alternative account the Normative Account. The purpose of this article is to strengthen the Normative Account by providing an independent vargument supporting it.
Funder
Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung
University of Zurich
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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