Abstract
AbstractIt is very natural to think that if two people, x and y, are qualitatively identical and have committed qualitatively identical actions, then it cannot be the case that one has committed something wrong whereas the other did not. That is to say, if x and y differ in their moral status, then it must be because x and y are qualitatively different, and not simply because x is identical to x and not identical to y. In this fictional dialogue between Socrates and Cantor involving infinitely many qualitatively identical agents, this assumption is challenged.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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