The Relational Analysis of Belief Ascriptions and Schiffer’s Puzzle

Abstract

AbstractUsing a variant of Schiffer’s puzzle regarding de re belief, I recently presented a new argument against the so-called Naive Russellian theory, consisting of the following theses: ($$NR_{1}$$ N R 1 ) The propositions we say and believe are Russellian propositions, i.e., structured propositions consisting of the objects, properties, and relations our thoughts and speech acts are about; ($$NR_{2}$$ N R 2 ) Names (and other singular terms) are directly referential terms, i.e., the propositional content of a name is just its referent; ($$NR_{3}$$ N R 3 ) A sentence of the form ‘A believes/disbelieves that S’ is true in a context c if and only if the referent of A in c believes/disbelieves the proposition expressed by S in c. In this paper, I will argue that my variant of Schiffer’s puzzle is not only a problem for the Naive Russellian theory, but for every theory of belief ascriptions entailing ($$NR_{3}$$ N R 3 ). Such theories are also called relational analyses of belief ascriptions. Here the main alternative to a Neo-Russellian theory, consisting of ($$NR_{1}$$ N R 1 ) and ($$NR_{2}$$ N R 2 ), is a Fregean theory, according to which the propositions we say and believe are Fregean propositions, i.e., structured propositions consisting of ways the objects, properties, and relations our thoughts and speech acts are about are presented to the speaker or agent. I will argue that such variants of the relational analysis are committed to principles very similar to the principles used by my Schiffer puzzle. Concluding, I will discuss Fregean and Neo-Russellian alternatives to the relational analysis, and I will argue that, although there are Neo-Russellian alternatives to the relational analysis which provide a solution to my variant of Schiffer’s puzzle, there seem to be no such Fregean alternatives.