Abstract
AbstractFew if any distinctions are more easily recognisable and assented to than that between objects, that is, things which are some ways, and that which they are, that is, ways for objects to be (‘ways of being’ for short). In this paper I present an argument designed to show that this distinction is indeterminate in the sense that the truth-conditions of predicational sentences leave open what should count as an object and a way of being. The bulk of the argument is inspired by the celebrated permutation argument advanced by Quine, Wallace, Putnam and others.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference31 articles.
1. Brown, S. (2017). Against instantiation as identity. Philosophical Studies, 174, 887–900.
2. Button, T. (2013). The limits of realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
3. Correia, F. (2016). On the logic of factual equivalence. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 9(1), 103–122.
4. Douven, I. (1999). Putnam’s model-theoretic argument reconstructed. Journal of Philosophy, 96(9), 479–490.
5. Dummett, M. (2015). What do permutation arguments prove. In R. Auxier, et al. (Eds.), The philosophy of Hillary Putnam. The library of living philosophers (Vol. XXXIV) (pp. 419–436). Chicago: Open Court.
Cited by
1 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献