Abstract
AbstractMeasurement realism, the view that measurement targets quantitative attributes and that not all attributes are quantitative, has come under attack both from metrologists and philosophers. In this paper, I take a close look at two influential arguments against measurement realism: the argument from obsolescence and the argument from coordination. I concede that these arguments do challenge the epistemological position traditionally taken by measurement realists, but argue that the metaphysical core of measurement realism survives the challenge posed by these arguments. This metaphysical core is vital to maintaining a clear and ambitious standard for successful measurement.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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