Abstract
AbstractI argue for the viability of one neglected way of developing supervenience-based objections to metaethical non-naturalism. This way goes through a principle known as ‘Hume’s Dictum’, according to which there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. I challenge several objections to the Hume’s Dictum-based argument. In the course of doing so, I formulate and motivate modest and precise versions of Hume’s Dictum, illustrate how arguments employing these principles might proceed, and argue that the Hume’s Dictum argument enjoys some advantages relative to other supervenience-based objections to non-naturalism.
Funder
University of Southern California
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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