Abstract
AbstractI claim that objective consequentialism (OC) faces a problem stemming from the existence in some situations of a plurality of chances relevant to the outcomes of an agent’s acts. I suggest that this phenomenon bears structural resemblance to the well-known Reference Class problem. I outline a few ways in which one could attempt to deal with the issue, suggesting that it is the higher-level chance that should be employed by OC.
Funder
Narodowe Centrum Nauki
European Research Council
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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