Abstract
AbstractWe have to gain from recognizing a relation between epistemic agents and the parts of subject matters that play a role in their cognitive lives. I call this relation “grasping”. Namely, I zone in on one notion of having a partial grasp of a subject matter—that of agents grasping part of the subject matter that they are attending to—and characterize it. I propose that giving up the idealization that we fully grasp the subject matters we attend to allows one to more realistically characterize the epistemic life of agents. To show this, I propose an epistemic logic with partial grasp that has in mind considerations from first-order aboutness theory with the aim of avoiding certain forms of logical omniscience, and which provides an alternative to immanent closure (Yablo Aboutness, Princeton University Press, 2014).
Funder
Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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