Knowledge-how and the limits of defeat

Author:

Kearl Timothy R.ORCID

Abstract

AbstractHow, if at all, is knowing how to do something defeasible? Some, the “intellectualists”, treat the defeasibility of knowledge-how as in some way derivative on the defeasibility of knowledge-that. According to a recent proposal by Carter and Navarro (Philos Phenomenol Res 3:662–685, 2017), knowledge-how defeat cannot be explained in terms of knowledge-that defeat; instead, knowledge-how defeat merits and entirely separate treatment. The thought behind “separatism” is easy to articulate. Assuming that knowledge of any kind is defeasible, since knowledge-that and knowledge-how are fundamentally different beasts, the best accounts of their defeasibility must reflect the underlying differences between them. I reject a separatist treatment of the defeasibility of knowledge-that and knowledge-how. One can acknowledge certain important differences between knowledge-that and knowledge-how without thereby needing two theories of defeasibility. Ultimately, though, I’ll argue that the defeasibility of basic knowledge-how, unlike non-basic knowledge-how, is a much more difficult issue than has been acknowledged.

Funder

HORIZON EUROPE European Research Council

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

General Social Sciences,Philosophy

Reference42 articles.

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2. Brogaard, B. (2009). What mary did yesterday: Reflections on knowledge-Wh. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78(2), 439–467.

3. Brogaard, B. (2011). Knowledge-how: A unified account. In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (Eds.), Knowing how: Essays on knowledge, mind, and action. Oxford University Press.

4. Carter, J. A., & Navarro, J. (2017). The defeasibility of knowledge-how. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3, 662–685.

5. Cath, Y. (2011). Knowing how without knowing that. In J. Bengson & M. Moffett (Eds.), Knowing how: Essays on knowledge, mind, and action. Oxford University Press.

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