Abstract
AbstractIn a recent paper in this journal Duncan Pritchard responds to an objection to the modal account of risk pressed by Ebert, Smith and Durbach (2020). In this paper, I expand upon the objection and argue that it still stands. I go on to consider a more general question raised by this exchange – whether risk is ‘objective’, or whether it is something that varies from one perspective to another.
Funder
Arts and Humanities Research Council
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
Reference21 articles.
1. Anderson, C. (2014). Fallibilism and the flexibility of epistemic modals. Philosophical Studies, v167(3), 597–606
2. DeRose, K. (1991). Epistemic possibilities. Philosophical Review, v100(4), 581–605
3. Dorr, C., & Hawthorne, J. (2013). Embedding epistemic modals. Mind, v122(488), 867–913
4. Dowell, J. (2017). Contextualism about epistemic modals. In J. Ichickawa (Ed.), The Routledge handbook of epistemic contextualism. Routledge
5. Ebert, P., Smith, M., & Durbach, I. (2020). Varieties of risk. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, v101(2), 432–455
Cited by
1 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. Reverse-Engineering Risk;Erkenntnis;2024-03-08