Abstract
AbstractWe argue that subjective Bayesians face a dilemma: they must offend against the spirit of their permissivism about rational credence or reject the principle that one should avoid accuracy dominance.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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