Abstract
Abstract
Recent results in the literature appear to show that it is impossible for two independent testimonies to jointly raise the probability of a proposition if neither testimony individually has any impact on that probability. I show that these impossibility results do not apply when testimonies agree on incidental details.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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