Abstract
AbstractJustified belief is a core concept in epistemology and there has been an increasing interest in its logic over the last years. While many logical investigations consider justified belief as an operator, in this paper, we propose a logic for justified belief in which the relevant notion is treated as a predicate instead. Although this gives rise to the possibility of liar-like paradoxes, a predicate treatment allows for a rich and highly expressive framework, which lives up to the universal ambitions of investigating epistemological concepts. We start with a base theory for justified belief, and then systematically present putative additional axioms for justified belief. We provide an overview of (in)consistency results when the additional principles are added to the base theory, and discuss their philosophical plausibility.
Funder
Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes
Baden-Württemberg Stiftung
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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