Abstract
AbstractFundamental epistemic values are values that best explain some epistemic evaluations. But there are, I argue, no epistemic evaluations which are best explained by positing truth as an epistemic value. So truth is not a fundamental epistemic value.
Funder
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Freiraum Förderlinie
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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