Sameness beyond numerical identity. A defence of the One Object View of Kant´s transcendental idealism

Abstract

AbstractSome Kant scholars argue that appearances and things in themselves are distinct things (Two Objects View). Others argue that they are the same things (One Object View). This last view is often understood as the claim that appearances and things in themselves are numerically identical (Numerical Identity). However, Walker (2010) and Stang (2014) show that Numerical Identity clashes against Kant’s claim that we lack knowledge of things in themselves (Noumenal Ignorance). I propose a weaker version of the One Object View that is not couched in terms of Numerical Identity and, consequently, avoids the problem raised by Walker and Stang. My case is based on a sustained analogy with perceptual experience that aims at showing that appearances and things in themselves are the same things in the following sense: the very same things can be presented under the mode of sensory intuition or (possibly) under the mode of intellectual intuition. Those things presented under the mode of sensory intuition are appearances; presented under the (possible) mode of intellectual intuition are things in themselves. This way of construing appearances and things in themselves preserves the core insight of the One Object View. At the same time, as it does not entail any isomorphism between appearances and things in themselves, it does not clash against Noumenal Ignorance.