A partial defense of intuition on naturalist grounds-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A partial defense of intuition on naturalist grounds

Published:2011-01-05 Issue:2 Volume:187 Page:321-341
ISSN:0039-7857
Container-title:Synthese
language:en
Short-container-title:Synthese

Author:

Shieber Joseph

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

General Social Sciences,Philosophy

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11229-010-9864-6.pdf

Reference71 articles.

1. Atran S. (1998) Taxonomic ranks, generic species, and core memes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21(4): 593–604

2. Baron-Cohen S. (1995) Mindblindness: An essay on autism and theory of mind. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

3. Barrett H. C., Kurzban R. (2006) Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychological Review 113(3): 628–647

4. Bealer G. (1998) Intuition and the autonomy of philosophy. In: DePaul M., Ramsey W. (eds) Rethinking intuition: The psychology of intuition and its role in philosophical inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, pp 201–239

5. Butterfill, S. What are modules and what is their role in development? Mind & Language, 22, 450–473

Cited by 29 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. An Analysis of the Centrality of Intuition Talk in the Discussion on Taste Disagreements;Filozofia Nauki;2021-12-03

2. EPISTEMOLOGÍA CRAIGUIANA Y EL ROL DE LAS INTUICIONES EN EL TEORIZAR EPISTEMOLÓGICO*;Kriterion: Revista de Filosofia;2018-08

3. The cognitive source of philosophical intuitions: Troubles for the etiological project;Belgrade Philosophical Annual;2018

4. Bibliography;The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology;2017-02-06

5. Pathological Experience;The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology;2017-02-06