Pragmatist reflective equilibrium

Abstract

AbstractRawls’ notion of reflective equilibrium has a hybrid character. It is embedded in the pragmatist tradition, but also includes various Kantian and other non-pragmatist elements. I argue that we should discard all non-pragmatist elements and develop reflective equilibrium in a consistently pragmatist manner. I argue that this pragmatist approach is the best way to defend reflective equilibrium against various criticisms, partly by embracing the critiques as advantages. I begin with discussing how each of the three versions of reflective equilibrium in Rawls’ work combines pragmatist and non-pragmatist elements. For Rawls, the primary purpose of reflective equilibrium is epistemic: namely, to construct moral theories or judgments. In a pragmatist approach, there are three connected purposes for moral inquiry: right action, reliable understanding and self-improvement. Depending on the specific context of a reflective equilibrium process, these general purposes can give rise to a variety of specific purposes. In the next sections, I develop a pragmatist approach to reflective equilibrium and discuss the implications of this approach for core elements of reflective equilibrium. These elements are: the initial convictions, facts, personal commitments and comprehensive views of life, coherence and additional methods for critical scrutiny.