Abstract
AbstractBelief is said to be subject to a norm of truth. A norm, intuitively, tells us what we ought to or may do. What sort of claim can truth make on us? On one standard view, the truth norm of belief is obliging. One ought to believe the truth and truth only. On another view, the truth norm of belief is permissive. One may believe the truth and truth only. Recently, it has been argued that the truth norm plays no interesting role in our normative theorizing for it issues excessive, unsatisfiable claims. This paper defends the truth norm of belief and proposes a novel answer to the question concerning its normative force on a reason-based framework. I argue that the normative force of the truth norm depends on the weight of truth as a normative reason for belief, which, just like that of any other normative reason, may vary across different contexts. I develop the idea that the weight of truth as a reason for belief is conditioned by what an epistemic agent can or cannot believe and modified by epistemic risk, among other things.
Funder
Arts and Humanities Research Council
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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