Abstract
AbstractThe paper explains how to integrate the knowledge-first approach to epistemology with the intellectualist thesis that knowing-how is a kind of knowing-that, with emphasis on their role in practical reasoning. One component of this integration is a belief-based account of desire.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
Reference37 articles.
1. Anscombe, G. E. M. (1957). Intention. Blackwell
2. Bengson, J., & Moffett, M. (Eds.). (2011). Knowing How. Essays on Knowledge, Mind and Action. Oxford University Press
3. Bradley, R., & List, C. (2009). Desire-as-belief revisited, Analysis, 69, 31–37
4. Byrne, A., & Hájek, A. (1997). David Hume, David Lewis, and decision theory, Mind 106, 411–428
5. Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press
Cited by
1 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献