Abstract
AbstractA popular approach in philosophy, the so-called Canberra Plan, is critically scrutinized. Two aspects of this research program, the formal and the informal program, are distinguished. It is argued that the formal program runs up against certain serious technical problems. It is also argued that the informal program involves an unclear leap at its core. Consequently, it is argued that the whole program is much more problematic than its advocates recognize.
Funder
Tampere University including Tampere University Hospital, Tampere University of Applied Sciences
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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