Abstract
AbstractAccording to the subjective view of lying, speakers can lie by asserting a true proposition, as long as they believe this proposition to be false. This view contrasts with the objective view, according to which lying requires the actual falsity of the proposition asserted. The aim of this paper is to draw attention to pairs of assertions that differ only in intuitively redundant content and to show that such pairs of assertions are a reason to favour the subjective view of lying over the objective one.
Funder
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
Reference50 articles.
1. Augustine. (395/2013). De Mendacio. In Opera/Werke, Vol. 50. Edited and translated by Alfons Städele. Schöningh.
2. Bach, K., & Harnish, R. (1979). Linguistic communication and speech acts. The MIT Press.
3. Benton, M. (2019). Lying, belief, and knowledge. In J. Meibauer (Ed.), The oxford handbook of lying (pp. 120–133). Oxford University Press.
4. Benton, M. A., & Van Elswyk, P. (2020). Hedged assertion. In S. Goldberg (Ed.), The oxford handbook of assertion (pp. 245–263). Oxford University Press.
5. Black, M. (1952). Definition, presupposition, and assertion. The Philosophical Review, 61(4), 532.
Cited by
3 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献
1. True lies and attempted lies;Inquiry;2024-06-12
2. The myth of true lies;Theoria;2023-05-20
3. NORMS OF SPEECH ACTS;STUDIA SEMIOTYCZNE;2022