Abstract
AbstractI provide and defend two natural accounts of (both relative and absolute) fundamentality for facts that do justice to the idea that the “degree of fundamentality” enjoyed by a fact is a matter of how far, from a ground-theoretic perspective, the fact is from the ungrounded facts.
Funder
Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung
Université de Genève
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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