Abstract
AbstractStandard evolutionary game theory investigates the evolutionary fitness of alternative behaviors in a fixed and single decision problem. This paper instead focuses on decision criteria, rather than on simple behaviors, as the general behavioral rules under selection in the population: the evolutionary fitness of classic decision criteria for rational choice is analyzed through Monte Carlo simulations over various classes of decision problems. Overall, quantifying the uncertainty in a probabilistic way and maximizing expected utility turns out to be evolutionarily beneficial in general. Minimizing regret also finds some evolutionary justifications in our results, while maximin seems to be always disadvantaged by differential selection.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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