Abstract
AbstractThis paper develops a puzzle about non-merely-verbal disputes. At first sight, it would seem that a dispute over the truth of an utterance is not merely verbal only if there is a proposition that the parties to the dispute take the utterance under dispute to express, which one of the parties accepts and the other rejects. Yet, as I argue, it is extremely rare for ordinary disputes over an utterance’s truth to satisfy this condition, in which case non-merely verbal disputes are extremely rare. After examining various responses to the puzzle, I outline a solution using the framework of truthmaker semantics.
Funder
Programa de becas posdoctorales de la coordinación de humanidades, UNAM
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
Cited by
9 articles.
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