Abstract
AbstractWe argue that social deliberation may increase an agent’s confidence and credence under certain circumstances. An agent considers a proposition H and assigns a probability to it. However, she is not fully confident that she herself is reliable in this assignment. She then endorses H during deliberation with another person, expecting him to raise serious objections. To her surprise, however, the other person does not raise any objections to H. How should her attitudes toward H change? It seems plausible that she should (i) increase the credence she assigns to H and, at the same time, (ii) increase the reliability she assigns to herself concerning H (i.e. her confidence). A Bayesian model helps us to investigate under what conditions, if any, this is rational.
Funder
Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
Reference39 articles.
1. Baron, J. (1987). Second-order probabilities and belief functions. Theory and Decision, 23(1), 25–36.
2. Bahrami, B., et al. (2010). Optimally interacting minds. Science, 329, 1081–1085.
3. Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
4. Christensen, D. (2009). Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy. Philosophy Compass, 4(5), 756–767.
5. Cohen, J. (1992). An essay on belief and acceptance. New York: Clarendon Press.
Cited by
1 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献