A case for animal reference: beyond functional reference and meaning attribution

Abstract

AbstractReference is a basic feature of human language. A much debated question in the scholarship on animal communication and language evolution is whether traces of the human capacity for reference can be found in animals too. Do animals refer to things with their signals in the manner that humans do? Or is reference something that is unique to human communication? Answers to these questions have shifted significantly over the years and remain contentious. In this paper, I start by reconstructing and critically analysing three influential discussions of the ways in which animal signals refer: the theory of functional reference (Marler, Evans and Hauser, 1992), Wheeler and Fischer (2012)’s meaning attribution framework, and Scarantino (2013)’s revised definition of functional reference. I show that functional reference, both in its traditional and revised version, as well as the meaning attribution framework, fail to adequately characterise animal reference as an evolutionary precursor of linguistic reference. This is because they all overlook at least some aspects of the psychology of signal production. Nonetheless, drawing on Crockford et al. (2012, 2017), I show that we can plausibly interpret chimpanzees’ alert hoos as a case of intentional, human-like animal reference.