Abstract
AbstractI develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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