Brittle virtue or bust: a new challenge to virtue-as-skill theories

Abstract

AbstractBuoyed by research in philosophy and moral psychology, virtue ethics has become increasingly influential in the literature. This renewed attention has also led to the development of the situationist challenge: empirical studies undermine the idea that we possess character traits that allow us to act virtuously across contexts. A promising reply to the situationist challenge is that we should not conceive of virtues as traits. Instead, we should conceive of them as expert skills. Here, I raise a new challenge for those who go in for the (s)kill against situationism. Expert skills are brittle, rather than flexible or robust. They typically develop in narrow ways and can falter in novel situations. Experts also sometimes perform worse than novices in novel situations. Such findings present a problem for the virtue-as-skill thesis. Someone who will help others only in narrow contexts or who causes more harm than good does not exemplify virtue. The brittleness of expert skills means that virtue theorists must either (a) abandon the idea that virtues explain behaviour across contexts or (b) abandon the idea that virtues are expert skills. It’s brittle virtue or bust – you can’t teach an old dogma new skills.