Abstract
AbstractIn a recent paper Ronald Meester and Timber Kerkvliet argue by example that infinite epistemic regresses have different solutions depending on whether they are analyzed with probability functions or with belief functions. Meester and Kerkvliet give two examples, each of which aims to show that an analysis based on belief functions yields a different numerical outcome for the agent’s degree of rational belief than one based on probability functions. In the present paper we however show that the outcomes are the same. The only way in which probability functions and belief functions can yield different solutions for the agent’s degree of belief is if they are applied to different examples, i.e. to different situations in which the agent finds himself.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
Reference18 articles.
1. Aikin, S. F. (2011). Epistemology and the regress problem. New York, Oxford: Routledge.
2. Aikin, S. F., & Peijnenburg, J. (2014). The regress problem. Metaphilosophy, 45, 139–145.
3. Atkinson, D., & Peijnenburg, J. (2017). Fading foundations. Probability and the regress problem. Dordrecht: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-58295-5.
4. Bonjour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
5. Dempster, A. P. (1967). Upper and lower probabilities induced by a multivalued mapping. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 38, 325–339.