Abstract
AbstractIn this article, I will use the frame-model to analyze different kinds of concept change. Mainly, I will use frames to distinguish between what I will call inter-conceptual change and intra-conceptual change as well as between conceptual structure change and conceptual content change. Further, I will introduce the notion of conceptual enrichment as opposed to conceptual change. To achieve these goals, I will expand the frame-model where necessary and exemplify the proposed extensions by means of a frame-based analysis of John L. Austin’s distinction between constative and performative utterances.
Funder
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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