Abstract
AbstractA common view is that self-identity is essential to objects if anything is. Itself a substantive metaphysical view, this is a position of some import in wider debates, particularly (but not exclusively) in connection with such problems as physicalism and personal identity. In this article I challenge the view. I distinguish between two accounts of essence, the modal and the definitional, and argue that self-identity is essential to objects on the former but not on the latter. After laying out my case, I deal with a number of objections.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
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