Abstract
AbstractDiagrams can serve as representational models in scientific research, yet important questions remain about how they do so. I address some of these questions with a historical case study, in which diagrams were modified extensively in order to elaborate an early hypothesis of protein synthesis. The diagrams’ modelling role relied mainly on two features: diagrams were modified according to syntactic rules, which temporarily replaced physico-chemical reasoning, and diagram-to-target inferences were based on semantic interpretations. I then explore the lessons for the relative roles of syntax, semantics, external marks, and mental images, for justifying diagram-to-target inferences, and for the “artefactual approach” to scientific models.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
General Social Sciences,Philosophy
Reference30 articles.
1. Bechtel, W. (2016). Using computational models to discover and understand mechanisms. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 56, 113–121.
2. Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: a mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421–441.
3. Downes, S. M. (2012). How much work do scientific images do? Spontaneous Generations: A Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science, 6(1), 115–130.
4. Frigg, R., & Hartmann, S. (2012). Models in science. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/models-science/.
5. Gamow, G. (1954). Possible relation between deoxyribonucleic acid and protein structures. Nature, 173, 318.