Imagination as a skill: A Bayesian proposal

Abstract

AbstractIn recent works, Kind (2020a, b) has argued that imagination is a skill, since it possesses the two hallmarks of skill: (i)improvability by practice, and (ii)control. I agree with Kind that (i) and (ii) are indeed hallmarks of skill, and I also endorse her claim that imagination is a skill in virtue of possessing these two features. However, in this paper, I argue that Kind’s case for imagination’s being a skill is unsatisfactory, since it lacks robust empirical evidence. Here, I will provide evidence for (i) by considering data from mental rotation experiments and for (ii) by considering data from developmental experiments. I conclude that imagination is a skill, but there is a further pressing question of how the cognitive architecture of imagination has to be structured to make this possible. I begin by considering how (ii) can be implemented sub-personally. I argue that this can be accounted for by positing a selection mechanism which selects content from memory representations to be recombined into imaginings, using Bayesian generation. I then show that such an account can also explain (i). On this basis, I hold that not only is imagination a skill, but that it is also plausibly implemented sub-personally by a Bayesian selection mechanism.