Abstract
AbstractA striking feature of our world is that we only seem to have records of the past. To explain this ‘record asymmetry’, Albert and Loewer claim that the Past Hypothesis induces a narrow probability density over the world’s possible past macrohistories, but not its future macrohistories. Because we’re indirectly acquainted with this low-entropy initial macrostate, our observations of records allow us to exploit the associated narrow density to infer the past. I will argue that Albert and Loewer cannot make sense of why this probabilistic structure exists without falling back on the very records they wish to explain. To avoid this circularity, I offer an alternative account: the ‘fork asymmetry’ explains the record asymmetry, and this in turn explains the narrow density—not vice versa.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference42 articles.
1. Albert, D. (2000). Time and chance. Harvard University Press.
2. Albert, D. (2014). The sharpness of the distinction between the past and the future. In A. Wilson (Ed.), Chance and temporal asymmetry (pp. 159–174). Oxford University Press.
3. Albert, D. (2016). After physics. Harvard University Press.
4. Albert, D. (2023). Conclusion. In B. Loewer, B. Weslake, & E. Winsberg (Eds.), The probability map of the universe: Essays on David Albert’s time and chance (pp. 351–376). Harvard University Press.
5. Arntzenius, F. (1992). The common cause principle. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 2, 227–237.