Epistemology of testimony and values in science

Abstract

AbstractThe paper has two interconnected objectives. It argues that the intrinsic epistemic value of testimonies (i.e., serving as evidence for what is asserted) can be reduced to their moral and social values, that is, to their competent, conscientious, and honest performance. Consequently, competence, conscientiousness, and honesty are intrinsic epistemic values in science. The second objective is to offer an answer to the questions why and under what conditions a hearer can rationally accept a testimony in science. The values and subsequent norms of testimony are espoused and strictly enforced by the scientific community. The norms of testimony ensure that rule-following scientists testify competently, conscientiously, and honestly. Due to value reduction, such testimonies also manifest their intrinsic epistemic value, that is, they serve as evidence for their content. So, if the norms of testimony are followed, then it is epistemically rational to adopt also the norm of the acceptance of testimonies. When the hearer accepts a testimony (unless he has counterevidence), he simply—and usually blindly—complies with this norm. Yet, he is epistemically rational because the norm he follows is epistemically rational, as well.