Tie-breaks and Two Types of Relevance

Abstract

AbstractSometimes we must choose between competing claims to aid or assistance, and sometimes those competing claims differ in strength and quantity. In such cases, we must decide whether the claims on each opposing side can be aggregated. Relevance views argue that a set of claims can be aggregated only if they are sufficiently strong (compared to the claims with which they compete) to be morally relevant to the decision. Relevance views come in two flavours: Local Relevance and Global Relevance. This paper presents a trilemma for both. Namely, that neither view can capture our intuition in tie-break cases, without forfeiting our intuitions in other important cases.The paper then presents a way to salvage relevance views and capture all our intuitions using a Hybrid view. By distinguishing between two types of relevance we can combine the strengths of Local and Global Relevance views such that we can hold all our intuitions, consistently and in a non-ad-hoc manner. Building on this, the paper demonstrates how we might amend the strongest formulation of a Relevance view, into a Hybrid account.The main focus of this paper is to develop a relevance view that can capture all the intuitions we have; however deeper justifications will still be needed for a full account of any relevance view. Thus, the end of the paper briefly considers what deeper justification might support the Hybrid view, indicating the direction such literature might go. Lastly, the paper considers the advantages of this view over a rival Hybrid view.