Abstract
AbstractWhy do relationships of friendship and love support partiality, but not relationships of hatred or commitments of racism? Where does partiality end and why? I take the intuitive starting point that important cases of partiality are meaningful. I develop a view whereby meaning is understood in terms of transcending self-limitations in order to connect with things of external value. I then show how this view can be used to distinguish central cases of legitimate partiality from cases of illegitimate partiality and how it puts pressure on the traditional way of thinking about partiality.
Funder
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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