Abstract
AbstractIn recent years, two competing methodological frameworks have developed in the study of the epistemology of philosophy. The traditional camp, led by experimental philosophy and its allies, has made inferences about the epistemology of philosophy based on the reactions, or intuitions, people have to works of philosophy. In contrast, multiple authors have followed the lead of Deutsch and Cappelen by setting aside experimental data in favor of inferences based on careful examination of the text of notable works of philosophy. In other words, the debate is split between authors focusing on philosophy’s consumption and those focusing on philosophy’s production. This paper examines the motivation for focusing on original texts and other evidence of philosophy’s production and finds it lacking. Drawing upon Hills’ distinction between propagation and transmission, I argue that the social epistemology of philosophy does not justify the recent focus on original texts of philosophy. Because the philosophical knowledge of consumers of philosophy is likely inspired by producers of philosophy, as opposed to epistemically grounded in the producers’ epistemic states, experimental philosophy had it right all along—if we want to know the epistemic standing of philosophy, we need to look to philosophy’s consumers.
Funder
Schweizerischer Nationalfonds zur Förderung der Wissenschaftlichen Forschung
University of Zurich
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference56 articles.
1. Anscombe, E. (1979). What is it to believe someone? In C. F. Delaney (Ed.), Rationality and religious belief. University of Notre Dame Press. https://philpapers.org/rec/ANSWII
2. Bird, A. (2007). What is scientific progress? Nous, 41(1), 64–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00638.x
3. Bourget, D., & Chalmers, D. J. (2022). Philosophers on philosophy: The 2020 philpapers survey.
4. Bourget, D., & Chalmers, D. J. (2014). What do philosophers believe? Philosophical Studies, 170(3), 465–500.
5. Brown, J. (2017). The Gettier case and intuition. Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem, 191–211.
Cited by
3 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献