Abstract
AbstractExpressivism is supposed to have an advantage over moral realism, in
that it can explain why it is a conceptual truth that the moral supervenes on
the natural, even though the natural does not entail the moral. I develop an analogy between expressivism and
a version of theistic moral realism, and argue that this version of theistic
moral realism shares any advantage that expressivism might have. It may be that the alleged advantage that
expressivism has over moral realism is overstated. Nevertheless, possible
analogies between expressivism and theistic moral realism have received very
little attention in the past, and are worth considering for their own sake.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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