Grounding, necessity, and relevance

Abstract

AbstractGrounding necessitarianism(GN) is the view that full grounds necessitate what they ground. Although GN has been rather popular among philosophers, it faces important counterexamples: For instance, A = [Socrates died] fully grounds C = [Xanthippe became a widow]. However, A fails to necessitate C: Acouldhave obtained together with B = [Socrates and Xanthippe were never married], without C obtaining. In many cases, the debate essentially reduces to whether A indeedfullygrounds C–as the contingentist claims–or if instead C is fully grounded in A+, namely Aplussome supplementary fact S (e.g. [Xanthippe was married to Socrates])–as the necessitarian claims. Both sides typically agree that A+necessitates C, while A does not; they disagree on whether A or A+fully grounds C. This paper offers a novel defence of the claim that, in these typical cases, unlike A+, A fails to fully ground C–thereby bringing further support to GN. First and foremost, unlike A+, A fails to fully ground C because it fails to contain just what isrelevantto do so, in two distinct senses–explanatoryandgenerativerelevance. Second, going for A, rather than A+, as a full ground undermines not just groundingnecessitarianism, but modally weaker views which even contingentists may want to preserve.