An ability-based theory of responsibility for collective omissions-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

An ability-based theory of responsibility for collective omissions

Published:2020-10-09 Issue:8 Volume:178 Page:2665-2685
ISSN:0031-8116
Container-title:Philosophical Studies
language:en
Short-container-title:Philos Stud

Author:

Metz Joseph^ORCID

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Philosophy

Link

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11098-020-01568-y.pdf

Reference71 articles.

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2. Bernstein, S. (2017). Causal proportions and moral responsibility. In D. Shoemaker (Ed.), Oxford studies in agency and responsibility (Vol. 4, pp. 165–182). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

3. Bratman, M. (1992). Shared cooperative activity. The Philosophical Review, 101(2), 327–341.

4. Bratman, M. (2014). Shared agency: A planning theory of acting together. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

5. Brodbeck, M. (1958). Methodological individualisms: Definition and reduction. Philosophy of Science, 25(1), 1–22.

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