Abstract
AbstractIt is natural to assume that every value bearer must be good, bad, or neutral. This paper argues that this assumption is false if value incomparability is possible. More precisely, if value incommensurability is possible, then there is a fourth category of absolute value, in addition to the good, the bad, and the neutral.
Funder
Riksbankens Jubileumsfond
University of Gothenburg
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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